Probabilities of consistent election outcomes with majorities based on difference in support by Diss, Mostapha & Pérez-Asurmendi, Patrizia
Group Decision and Negotiation manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Probabilities of consistent election outcomes with
majorities based on difference in support
Received: date / Accepted: date
Abstract Computer simulations are used to evaluate the likelihood of con-
sistent outcomes under the class of majorities based on difference in support.
These majorities require certain consensus in collective preferences to declare
an alternative as the winner. More precisely, individuals show preference in-
tensities in the unit interval among each pair of alternatives and it is required
that the winner alternative obtains a difference in the sum of the intensities
with respect to the loser alternative. This difference is a real number located
between 0 and the total number of voters. We introduce the values of the re-
quired threshold for which majorities based on difference in support lead to
transitive and triple-acyclic collective decisions with a probability of 1. Our
results improve the previous theoretical ones since they require softer thresh-
olds to reach consistent collective decisions.
Keywords: Computer simulations; Majorities based on difference in support;
Probability; Transitivity; Triple-acyclicity.
1 Introduction
Many consistent conditions such as the transitivity are imposed as minimal
requirement concerning any social choice rule used to aggregate individual
preferences into a collective outcome. Transitivity represents the idea that, for
an individual or collective preference, when alternative x1 is preferred to x2
and x2 is preferred to x3 then x1 is preferred to x3. The literature related to
this notion dates back 200 years to the great work of the Marquis de Con-
dorcet (1785) which states that voters with individual transitive rankings can
produce an election outcome which is not transitive if one chooses pairwise
majority voting as aggregation. This result gave rise to numerous studies and
promoted the probabilistic study of the occurrence of voting paradoxes and
their consequences under different aggregation rules.
2The probability of voting paradoxes has been the subject of a whole strand
of literature. Under this approach, it is assumed an a priori probability model
to describe the individual preferences, derived the conditions under which the
paradox appears and reached probabilities through combinatoric calculus. In
this context, stand out the studies about majority rule (Fishburn and Gehrlein
1980; Gehrlein 1983; Gehrlein and Fishburn 1976), supermajority rules (Bal-
asko and Cre`s 1997; Tovey 1997) or scoring rules (Cervone et al 2005; Gehrlein
and Fishburn 1980, 1981, 1983), among others. To circumvent the impossibil-
ity of having analytical results, other papers have undertaken a methodology
using computer simulations of elections. Specifically, the study of the cyclical
and intransitive collective decisions under the simple majority rule are carried
out in Campbell and Tullock (1965); DeMeyer and Plott (1970); Jones et al
(1995); Klahr (1966), among others.
Voting rules based on the majority principle are the most studied in the
literature and that principle remains one of the most widely used voting rules
in real life. The majority rule, and other classic voting systems, have the ad-
vantage of being simple to use and easy to understand by the voters but they
have major drawbacks. One of them is based on the idea that the preferences
expressed by the voters are assumed to be dichotomous (also called crisp or or-
dinal), i.e. individuals can only declare if an alternative is preferred to another,
or if they are indifferent. As the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen (1970) has noted,
“voters opinions can be misrepresented when the preferences are dichotomous
in the sense that the collective decision does not take into consideration the
intensities of each individual preference”. The importance of considering in-
tensities in the individual preferences has also been noted in Cook and Kress
(1985); Meek (1975); Nurmi (1981, 2008); Tanino (1984), and Morales (1797)
(see translation in McLean and Urken (1995)), among others.
Reciprocal preferences have been introduced in the literature in order to
deal with preference intensities. This framework allows individuals to show
preference intensities among each pair of alternatives by a real number in
the unit interval [0, 1]. It is clear that the information contained in reciprocal
preferences is much richer than the case of dichotomous preferences. Indeed,
for each voter, a reciprocal preference between two alternatives x1 and x2
expresses the degree by which the voter prefers x1 to x2. More precisely, the
closer the intensity is to 1, the more x1 is preferred to x2, and the closer the
intensity is to 0, the more x2 is preferred to x1. In addition, an intensity of
0.5 stands for the exact indifference between the two alternatives x1 and x2.
Following this approach, when we extend the set of alternatives from two to
three alternatives, we assume that each individual reciprocal preference fulfil
some properties of transitivity in order to guarantee individual rationality of
each reciprocal preference.
Considering preference intensities, majorities based on difference in sup-
port M˜k have been introduced in the literature as a possible aggregation sys-
tem. These majorities require certain consensus in collective preferences to
declare an alternative as the winner and depend on the idea of a threshold.
More precisely, these aggregation rules suggest that alternative x1 is preferred
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to alternative x2 if and only if the sum of the intensities for x1 exceeds the
aggregated intensity of x2 by a threshold k given by a real number located
between 0 and the total number of voters. In other words, a higher value of
k means that a stronger preference for x1 over x2 is needed in order to x1 to
be declared socially preferred to x2. Conversely, a low value of k means that a
weak preference for x1 over x2 is needed to declare x1 socially preferred to x2.
The axiomatic characterization of majorities based on difference in support is
introduced in Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Llamazares (2010). Notice that, for other
kinds of operators which can be used for the aggregation of reciprocal prefer-
ences and their characterizations, the reader is referred to Garc´ıa-Lapresta and
Llamazares (2000); Llamazares (2004, 2007); Llamazares and Garc´ıa-Lapresta
(2003, 2008), among others.
This paper is devoted to analyze the probabilities of consistent collective
decisions over the class of majorities based on difference in support. We specif-
ically calculate the probabilities of transitive and triple-acyclic strict collec-
tive preferences and the corresponding ones of transitive weak collective pref-
erences for these majorities. To calculate these probabilities, we apply the
Monte-Carlo simulation methodology inspired by the studies in Campbell and
Tullock (1965); DeMeyer and Plott (1970); Jones et al (1995); Klahr (1966),
among others.
Specifically, we generate the individual reciprocal preference relations for
the case of three alternatives. Each individual intensity of preference is under-
stood as a continuous random variable in the unit interval consistently built
with a specific transitivity condition over the individual’s reciprocal prefer-
ence relations. Then, we fix the required difference in support and aggregate
these individual preferences with the corresponding majority based on differ-
ence in support. We derive the resultant collective ordering of alternatives and
evaluate its consistency. Finally, we iterate that procedure to estimate desired
probabilities as the number of consistent orderings over the total number of
simulated collective orderings.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, the methodology proposed
here allows us to hypothesize about a relationship between the type of in-
dividual preference intensities and the likelihood of consistent collective de-
cisions. Intuitively, we expected to find softer conditions to have consistent
collective decisions with probability 1 as individuals are more rational, i.e.
the strongest the assumed individual transitivity condition is. As we will see,
our results refute that idea. Second, we compare our results on probabilities
with the theoretical ones about the consistency of the collective preferences
under majorities based on difference in support in Llamazares et al (2013)
and Llamazares and Pe´rez-Asurmendi (2015). In these articles, necessary and
sufficient conditions for which these majorities provide transitive and triple-
acyclic collective decisions have been introduced. The algebraic tools used in
the proofs lead to several impossibility results. Specifically, for the case of the
transitivity of the collective decisions they proved that it can be always found
an example of intransitive collective preferences when the individual transitiv-
ity condition is weak. In the case of assuming stronger conditions to individual
4preferences, the collective preference is transitive only when individual prefer-
ences show a higher level of unanimity. Although they found less demanding
conditions in their results about the triple-acyclicity of the collective decision,
it is also required a high level of similarity in individual preferences in order to
find consistent collective decisions. Under the probabilistic approach followed
here, the required conditions for having consistent collective decisions are much
softer than there promoting the use of these types of majorities whenever the
consistency of the collective decision is a concern for the society or the policy
maker.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical frame-
work followed in this paper and introduces majorities based on difference in
support. Section 3 is devoted to the method of simulation. Sections 4 and 5
discuss the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a set of alternatives X = {x1, x2, x3} in an election with m individ-
uals. Let S be a binary relation on X, i.e. a subset of the Cartesian product
X×X. In what follows, xiSxj stands for (xi, xj) ∈ S, i.e. when xi is in the re-
lation S with xj . S
−1 is the inverse relation of S defined by xiS−1xj ⇔ xjSxj
and Sc is the complement relation of S defined by xiS
cxj ⇔ ¬(xiSxj). Given
two binary relations S and T , the intersection of S and T is also a binary
relation defined by xi(S ∩ T )xj ⇔ (xiSxj ∧ xiTxj). A binary relation S on X
is
1. reflexive if ∀x ∈ X, xSx,
2. symmetric if ∀xi, xj ∈ X, xiSxj ⇒ xjSxi,
3. asymmetric if ∀xi, xj ∈ X, xiSxj ⇒ ¬(xjSxi),
4. antisymmetric if ∀xi, xj ∈ X, (xiSxj ∧ xjSxi)⇒ xi = xj ,
5. complete if ∀xi, xj ∈ X, xiSxj ∨ xjSxi,
6. transitive if ∀xi, xj , xl ∈ X, (xiSxj ∧ xjSxl)⇒ xiSxl,
7. triple-acyclic if ∀xi, xj , xl ∈ X, (xiSxj ∧ xjSxl)⇒ ¬(xlSxi).
A weak preference R is a complete binary relation on the set of alternatives
X. The strict preference P associated with R is the asymmetric binary relation
on X defined by P = (R−1)c and the corresponding indifference relation I is
the reflexive and symmetric binary relation on X defined by I = R ∩ R−1.
P(X) is the set of strict preferences. A weak ordering is a transitive weak
preference whereas a linear ordering is also antisymmetric.
From definitions above it is well known that any weak ordering implies
a transitive strict preference relation and a transitive indifference relation.
Moreover, any transitive strict preference is also a triple-acyclic preference
relation. Notice that the converse is not true.
Given that the social decision between two alternatives is given by either a
strict preference relation or an indifference relation, and that three alternatives
are in contest, we consider the 27 cases in Table 1 as possible social outcomes.
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Table 1 Possible social outcomes in a three-alternative election.
1. x1Px2 x2Px3 x1Px3 10. x1Ix2 x2Px3 x1Px3 19. x1Ix2 x2Px3 x1Ix3
2. x1Px3 x3Px2 x1Px2 11. x2Ix3 x3Px1 x2Px1 20. x1Px2 x2Px3 x1Ix3
3. x2Px1 x1Px3 x2Px3 12. x1Ix3 x3Px2 x1Px2 21. x3Px1 x1Px2 x2Ix3
4. x2Px3 x3Px1 x2Px1 13. x1Ix2 x2Ix3 x1Ix3 22. x2Px3 x3Px1 x1Ix2
5. x3Px1 x1Px2 x3Px2 14. x1Px2 x2Ix3 x1Ix3 23. x3Px2 x1Px3 x1Ix2
6. x3Px2 x2Px1 x3Px1 15. x1Ix2 x2Ix3 x1Px3 24. x2Px1 x1Px3 x2Ix3
7. x1Px2 x2Ix3 x1Px3 16. x1Ix2 x2Ix3 x3Px1 25. x3Px2 x2Px1 x1Ix3
8. x2Px1 x1Ix3 x2Px3 17. x1Ix3 x3Px2 x1Ix2 26. x1Px2 x2Px3 x3Px1
9. x3Px1 x1Ix2 x3Px2 18. x2Px1 x1Ix3 x2Ix3 27. x2Px1 x1Px3 x3Px2
Our interest focuses on the frequency of consistent social outcomes given
the 27 possible outcomes above. We distinguish among three cases of consis-
tent outcomes; the case of weak orderings corresponding to the first thirteen
outcomes, the case of transitive strict preferences corresponding to the first
nineteen and the case of triple-acyclic strict preferences corresponding to the
first twenty-fifth outcomes.
2.1 Individual preferences
We consider that individuals compare the alternatives on X by pairs and de-
clare their preferences by means of values rpij which belong to the unit interval
[0, 1] with the following interpretation: rpij > 0.5 indicates that the individual p
prefers the alternative xi to the alternative xj , the more the nearer is the value
of rpij to 1 that represents the maximum degree of preference for xi over xj ;
conversely, rpij < 0.5, means that individual p prefers alternative xj to xi, the
more the nearer is the value of rpij to 0 that represents the maximum degree of
preference for xj over xi; finally, r
p
ij = 0.5 stands for the indifference between
xi and xj for individual p. The reciprocity of these preferences is described by
the condition rpij + r
p
ji = 1.
As noted in the Introduction, to avoid the possibility of having incoherent
individual preferences, we need to assume some kind of rationality condition.
But, in this framework, several concepts could be taken to ensure such ratio-
nality requirement (see, among others, Dasgupta and Deb 1996; Dubois and
Prade 1980; Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Meneses 2005; Zadeh 1971). Here, we con-
sider the following transitivity conditions for reciprocal preference relations.
Definition 1 We say that individual p is
1. 0.5–transitive if ∀ i, j, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}
(rpij > 0.5 ∧ rpjl > 0.5) ⇒ rpil > 0.5,
2. min–transitive if ∀ i, j, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}
(rpij > 0.5 ∧ rpjl > 0.5) ⇒ rpil ≥ min{rpij , rpjl},
63. am–transitive if ∀ i, j, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}
(rpij > 0.5 ∧ rpjl > 0.5) ⇒ rpil ≥
(
rpij + r
p
jl
)
/2,
4. max–transitive if ∀ i, j, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}
(rpij > 0.5 ∧ rpjl > 0.5) ⇒ rpil ≥ max{rpij , rpjl}.
The preferences of each individual over the alternatives in X = {x1, x2, x3}
can be represented using a 3× 3 matrix Rp =
Ä
rpij
ä
as follows:
Rp =
Ö
0.5 rp12 r
p
13
1− rp12 0.5 rp23
1− rp13 1− rp23 0.5
è
. (1)
Individual preferences are collected in a vector where each vector-element
represents the preferences of an individual. Assuming m individuals1 a profile
of reciprocal preferences is a vector (R1, . . . , Rm) ∈ R(X)m, where R(X) the
set of all reciprocal preference relations.
2.2 Majorities based on difference in support
In Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Llamazares (2010), majorities based on difference in
support were introduced in the framework of reciprocal preferences allowing
individuals to declare their degrees of preferences over pairs of alternatives.
Majorities based on difference in support allow us to aggregate each profile
of reciprocal preferences into a strict collective preference Pk over the set of
alternatives. Under these rules, the winner alternative is required to reach a
support that exceeds the support for the other alternative in a quantity, fixed
before the voting process. Formal definition for these majorities is as follows.
Definition 2 (Majorities based on difference in support or M˜k ma-
jorities Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Llamazares (2010)) Given k ∈ [0,m),
the majority based on difference in support or M˜k majority is the mapping
M˜k : R(X)m −→ P(X) defined by M˜k(R1, . . . , Rm) = Pk, where
xi Pk xj ⇔
m∑
p=1
rpij >
m∑
p=1
rpji + k. (2)
Using the fact that rpij = 1− rpji for each voter p, (2) is equivalent to:
xi Pk xj ⇔
∑m
p=1 r
p
ij
m
> 0.5 +
k
2m
. (3)
1 To calculate the probabilities presented here, m takes the following values: 3, 4, 5, 10,
100, 1,000 and 100,000.
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The indifference relation associated with Pk is defined by:
xi Ik xj ⇔
∣∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
p=1
rpij −
m∑
p=1
rpji
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ k. (4)
Putting the relation rpij = 1− rpji into (4), one obtains:
xi Ik xj ⇔
∣∣∣∣∣
∑m
p=1 r
p
ij
m
− 0.5
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ k2m. (5)
Example 1 Let RI and RII be the following reciprocal preference relations
over the alternatives on X = {x1, x2, x3}.
RI =
Ñ
0.5 1 0.9
0 0.5 0.6
0.1 0.4 0.5
é
, RII =
Ñ
0.5 0.8 1
0.2 0.5 0.7
0 0.3 0.5
é
.
Consider the profile (R1, R2, R3, R4, R5) where
Rp =
®
RI if p = 1, 2, 3,
RII if p = 4, 5.
Assuming a required difference in support k equal to 1.75 and applying the
corresponding M˜1.75 majority we have
5∑
p=1
rp12 = 4.6 >
5∑
p=1
rp21 + 1.75 = 0.4 + 1.75⇒ x1 P1.75 x2,∣∣∣∣∣∣
5∑
p=1
rp23 −
5∑
p=1
rp32
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = |3.2− 1.8| ≤ 1.75⇒ x2 I1.75 x3,
5∑
p=1
rp13 = 4.7 >
5∑
p=1
rp31 + 1.75 = 0.3 + 1.75⇒ x1 P1.75 x3.
As noticed in the Introduction, in the case of crisp preferences, given a
pair of alternatives, individuals declare if they prefer an alternative to another
one or if they are indifferent between them. In other words, the values of rpij
are restricted to the set of discrete values {0, 0.5, 1}. If rpij = 1, individual p
prefers alternative xi to alternative xj , whereas if r
p
ij = 0, individual p prefers
xj to xi. If r
p
ij = 0.5, individual p is indifferent between both alternatives.
In this framework, the concept of majorities based on difference of votes was
introduced in Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Llamazares (2001) and was later axiomat-
ically characterized in Llamazares (2006), and subsequently in Houy (2007).
Under these majorities, an alternative, say xi, is declared the winner if the
number of individuals who prefer that alternative, to the other one, say xj ,
8exceeds the number of individuals who prefer xj to xi in a difference of votes,
fixed before the election process. With m individuals, that difference could
take any integer value in {0, . . . ,m − 1}. It is clear that these majorities are
located between simple majority rule when the difference of votes is zero and
unanimity when the difference of votes is the total number of individuals m
minus one.
Assuming weak or linear individual orderings and using the well-known
Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) condition (Gehrlein and Fishburn 1976),
calculations of the probabilities of consistent outcomes (transitivity and triple-
acyclicity) under majorities based on difference in votes have been conducted
in Diss and Pe´rez-Asurmendi (2015). The IAC condition assumes that all vot-
ing situations are drawn independently and uniformly given that each voting
situation indicates a specific combination of the number of voters associated
with each order of the alternatives. The objective of Diss and Pe´rez-Asurmendi
(2015) was twofold. First, the needed thresholds which guarantee that the
probability of consistent outcomes is close to 1 have been found. Second, the
authors have set forth the impact of weak orderings and linear orderings for the
individual preferences on the probability of consistent outcomes. It is shown
for instance that in the cases of transitive and triple-acyclic strict preferences,
the probabilities are higher considering weak than linear orderings.
In the present paper, we extend the study in Diss and Pe´rez-Asurmendi
(2015) to the majorities based on difference in support M˜k. However, as long
as the intensities of preference between each pair of alternatives can take any
value in the continuous interval [0, 1], the IAC model can not be applied. Our
difficulty is that there is not any equivalent model to IAC in the framework
of reciprocal preferences since the set of voting situations is not numerable. In
other words, the probabilistic analysis carried out in Diss and Pe´rez-Asurmendi
(2015) turns impossible to study in the case of majorities based on difference
in support M˜k. Consequently, we perform a computer simulation to estimate
these probabilities. Our simulation method will follow the same spirit as the
Impartial Culture (IC) condition (Guilbaud 1952), a well-known model which
considers the set of all preference profiles as a sample space and where a voter
preference profile identifies the specific preference ranking that each voter has
for the candidates. Notice that individual voter’s preferences are not anony-
mous under IC condition while they are under IAC assumption.
3 Simulation method
In this section, we detail the simulation method used in this paper in order to
provide the probabilities of reaching consistent collective decisions under M˜k
majorities. Our probabilities are estimated as the proportion of the number
of consistent outcomes in the simulation over the total number of simulated
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outcomes. We generate 100,000 outcomes to guarantee our results with a con-
fidence level of 99% and a sampling error of less than a 0.0041%2.
In the following, we describe the methodology applied in the simulations to
estimate the probability for the considered three types of consistent collective
decisions under M˜k majorities, i.e. transitive weak preferences, transitive and
triple-acyclic strict preferences. We follow that scheme taking into account
each type of individual transitive reciprocal relations, i.e. 0.5–transitive, min–
transitive, am–transitive and max–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
Notice that the matrix in (1) representing a reciprocal preference relation is
determined by the vector composed of the intensities r12, r23 and r13.
1. At the beginning of the evaluation, we randomly generate m vectors repre-
senting the reciprocal preferences of the m individuals. For each individual,
each component of the triplet (r12, r23, r13) is drawn from an uniform distri-
bution on [0; 1]. Such vectors are built bearing in mind one of the considered
transitivity conditions for reciprocal preference relations. In other words, if
the resulting individual reciprocal preference (r12, r23, r13) is not transitive
for the function under consideration (i.e. 0.5–transitivity, min–transitivity,
am–transitivity and max–transitivity), it is rejected. This first step ends
when exactly m individual transitive reciprocal preferences are generated.
2. We compute the sum of the individuals’ intensities of preference over each
pair of alternatives relative to the number of voters m through a vector
S = (S12m ,
S23
m ,
S13
m ) where Sij =
m∑
p=1
rpij .
3. Having in mind the conditions in equations (3) and (5) and the value of
the threshold a = k2m , the collective decision is evaluated over each pair of
alternatives in the vector S.
4. The collective decision in S is classified following the cases of possible col-
lective outcomes displayed in Table 1. For instance, the case 27 corresponds
to S12m < 0.5 − a, S23m < 0.5 − a, and S13m > 0.5 + a. Indeed, if the collec-
tive decision is one of the cases 26 or 27, the strict preference Pk is not
triple-acyclic. If it is one of the cases from 19 to 27, the strict preference
Pk is not transitive. Finally, if it is one of the cases from 14 to 27, the weak
preference Rk is not transitive.
2 Assuming a proportion of consistent outcomes P on the population of a 50%, the pro-
portion p in a random sample of size n ≥ 30 for a confidence level of 99%, diverges from the
one of the population in an error of less than :
Prob(|P − p| ≤ ) ≥ 0.99.
Taken into account that the sample proportion p is distributed as N
Ä
P,
√
P (1− P )/n
ä
,
the sampling error  is as follows:
 = zα/2
√
P (1− P )/n.
In our case, n = 100,000 and the corresponding percentile of the normal distribution for a
confidence level of 99% is zα/2 = 2.57. Thus,  ≤ 0.00407.
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5. This four steps are iterated 100,000 times to obtain the number of incon-
sistent collective decisions. Specifically, the number of simulated outcomes
in which the weak preference Rk is transitive, in which the strict preference
Pk is transitive and in which Pk is triple-acyclic, respectively.
6. Finally, each of the desired probabilities, i.e. the probability of transitive
Rk and the probability of transitive and triple-acyclic Pk, is calculated
as the number of consistent outcomes over the total number of simulated
outcomes.
Below, the code used for the evaluation of our probabilities is presented for
the case of am–transitive individual reciprocal preferences, a number of voters
m = 3 and a required threshold k = 0.1.
Simulation code: the case of am–transitive individual reciprocal prefer-
ences, m = 3, and k = 0.1.
disp(’Start’);
m=3;
s=100000;
k=0.1;
a=(k/(2*m));
A=zeros (m,3);
success=0;
for i=1:s
while (success < m)
R=rand (1,3);
if (( (R(1))≥0.5)&&(R(2))≥0.5)
if ( (R(3)≥((R(1)+R(2))/2)))
success=success+1;
A(success,1)=R(1);
A(success,2)=R(2);
A(success,3)=R(3);
end;
elseif (( (R(3))≥0.5)&&(1-R(2))≥0.5)
if ( (R(1)≥((R(3)+1-R(2))/2)))
success=success+1;
A(success,1)=R(1);
A(success,2)=R(2);
A(success,3)=R(3);
end;
elseif (((1-R(1))≥0.5)&&(R(3))≥0.5)
if ( (R(2)≥((1-R(1)+R(3))/2)))
success=success+1;
A(success,1)=R(1);
A(success,2)=R(2);
A(success,3)=R(3);
end;
elseif (((R(2))≥0.5)&&(1-R(3))≥0.5)
if ( (1-R(1)≥((R(2)+1-R(3))/2)))
success=success+1;
A(success,1)=R(1);
A(success,2)=R(2);
A(success,3)=R(3);
end;
elseif (( (R(1))≥0.5)&&(1-R(3))≥0.5)
if ( (1-R(2)≥((R(1)+1-R(3))/2)))
success=success+1;
A(success,1)=R(1);
A(success,2)=R(2);
A(success,3)=R(3);
end;
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elseif (( (1-R(2))≥0.5)&&(1-R(1))≥0.5)
if ( (1-R(3)≥((1-R(2)+1-R(1))/2)))
success=success+1;
A(success,1)=R(1);
A(success,2)=R(2);
A(success,3)=R(3);
end;
else
disp (’Non matchee’);
end;
end;
S=(sum(A,1)/m);
cond27=(S(1)<(0.5-a)&&S(2)<(0.5-a)&&S(3)>(0.5+a));
cond26=(S(1)>(0.5+a)&&S(2)>(0.5+a)&&S(3)<(0.5-a));
cond25=(S(1)<(0.5-a)&&S(2)<(0.5-a)&&abs(S(3)-0.5)≤a);
cond24=(S(1)<(0.5-a)&&abs(S(2)-0.5)≤a&&S(3)>(0.5+a));
cond23=(abs(S(1)-0.5)≤a&&S(2)<(0.5-a)&&S(3)>(0.5+a));
cond22=(abs(S(1)-0.5)≤a&&S(2)>(0.5+a)&&S(3)<(0.5-a));
cond21=(S(1)>(0.5+a)&&abs(S(2)-0.5)≤a&&S(3)<(0.5-a));
cond20=(S(1)>(0.5+a)&&S(2)>(0.5+a)&&abs(S(3)-0.5)≤a);
cond19=(abs(S(1)-0.5)≤a&&S(2)>(0.5+a)&&abs(S(3)-0.5)≤a);
cond18=(S(1)<(0.5-a)&&abs(S(2)-0.5)≤a&&abs(S(3)-0.5)≤a);
cond17=(abs(S(1)-0.5)≤a&&S(2)<(0.5-a)&&abs(S(3)-0.5)≤a);
cond16=(abs(S(1)-0.5)≤a&&abs(S(2)-0.5)≤a &&S(3)<(0.5-a));
cond15=(abs(S(1)-0.5)≤a&&abs(S(2)-0.5)≤a&&S(3)>(0.5+a));
cond14=(S(1)>(0.5+a)&&abs(S(2)-0.5)≤a&&abs(S(3)-0.5)≤a);
if (cond26||cond27)
outtc=1;
else
outtc=0;
end;
M(1,i)=outtc;
success=0;
S=[];
if (outtc==1||cond20||cond21||cond22||cond23||cond24||cond25)
outnt=1;
else
outnt=0;
end;
M(2,i)=outnt;
success=0;
S=[];
if (outnt==1||cond14||cond15||cond16||cond17||cond18||cond19)
outcw=1;
else
outcw=0;
end;
M(3,i)=outcw;
success=0;
S=[];
end;
D=sum(M,2);
E=s-D;
Probta=E(1)/s
Probtr=E(2)/s
Probcw=E(3)/s
disp(’Finish’);
In the appendix, the simulated probabilities of consistent collective deci-
sions under M˜k majorities are listed in tables. Main results are introduced in
Section 4.
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4 Results: Probabilities of consistent collective decisions under
majorities based on difference in support
From our results, it is obvious to show that the probability of having transitive
weak preferences Rk, the probability of having transitive strict preferences
Pk, and the probability of having triple-acyclic strict preferences Pk are the
same when k = 0 regarding each type of g–transitivity. For instance, for k =
0 and 0.5–transitivity, Table A.1, Table A.5, and Table A.9 show that this
probability is equal to 0.8835 for m = 3. Indeed, when k = 0, the indifference
in each collective preference is not allowed and the possible social outcomes in
Table 1 are reduced to cases from 1 to 6 and the two cycles 26 and 27. As a
consequence, the three probabilities are the same. However, when the threshold
k increases, Table 2 illustrates that the lower the consistency condition over
the collective decision is, the higher the simulated probability of consistency
is, regarding each type of g–transitivity. To illustrate this result, we first take
into account the threshold k = 0.1 for m = 1,000. For 0.5–transitive individual
preferences, we deduce from Table 2 that the probability of having transitive
weak preferences Rk (0.8679) is smaller than the one of having transitive strict
preferences Pk (0.8680), which is in turn smaller than the probability of having
triple-acyclic strict preferences Pk(0.8733). This is true for the other types
of g–transitivity (i.e. min–transitivity, am–transitivity, and max–transitivity).
We also take into account the threshold k = 3 in order to illustrate that this
variation holds for other values of k. In addition, Table 2 illustrates that as
well as the threshold k increases the difference between the three probabilities
increases. For instance, for k = 0.1 and 0.5–transitivity, the difference between
the probability of having transitive weak preferences Rk and the probability
of having triple-acyclic strict preferences Pk is equal to 0.0054 whereas this
difference is given by 0.1512 for k = 3.
Table 2 Simulated probabilities of consistent decisions with m = 1,000.
0.5–trans. min–trans. am–trans. max–trans.
k = 0.1
Rk transitive 0.8679 0.9459 0.9657 0.9713
Pk transitive 0.8680 0.9460 0.9658 0.9714
Pk triple-acyclic 0.8733 0.9491 0.9685 0.9739
k = 3
Rk transitive 0.7816 0.8802 0.9113 0.9184
Pk transitive 0.8267 0.9245 0.9536 0.9609
Pk triple-acyclic 0.9328 0.9827 0.9923 0.9945
One of the main facts we can observe from the simulations is that, for a
given number of voters m, when the threshold k increases, we find that:
- The probability of having transitive weak preferences Rk first decreases and
then increases.
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- The probability of having transitive strict preferences Pk first decreases and
then increases.
- The probability of having triple-acyclic strict preferences Pk increases. This
is true for each value of the threshold k, even for small values. Indeed,
when k = 0 the probability of triple-acyclic Pk is equal to 0.8835, 0.9563,
0.9751, and 0.9777 for 0.5-transitivity, min-transitivity, am-transitivity, and
max-transitivity, respectively. However, even for a small value k = 0.001,
the probability to observe a triple-acyclic Pk increases to 0.8838, 0.9566,
0.9753, and 0.9778.
- These three facts hold with independence of the assumed individual transi-
tivity condition.
These results are shown by the probabilities of each table in the Appendix
when m ≥ 100. However, for small values of m and the considered thresholds,
these simulations only show the increase in the probability of transitive Rk and
transitive Pk. That seems to contradict above remarks about the behavior of
the probabilities. In Table 3 we set m = 3 and consider several values of k to
clarify that.
Table 3 The impact of the threshold k on the probability of consistent outcomes for a
given number of voters. The example of m = 3.
k = 0 k = 0.1 k = 0.5 k = 1 k = 2
0.5–trans.
Rk transitive 0.8835 0.8339 0.6110 0.5438 0.8883
Pk transitive 0.8835 0.8497 0.8626 0.9587 0.9994
Pk triple-acyclic 0.8835 0.9216 0.9890 0.9997 1
min–trans.
Rk transitive 0.9563 0.9222 0.7444 0.6551 0.8978
Pk transitive 0.9563 0.9383 0.9642 0.9950 1
Pk triple-acyclic 0.9563 0.9779 0.9997 1 1
am–trans.
Rk transitive 0.9751 0.9476 0.7987 0.7036 0.8913
Pk transitive 0.9751 0.9629 0.9844 0.9988 1
Pk triple-acyclic 0.9751 0.9899 1.0000 1 1
max–trans.
Rk transitive 0.9777 0.9518 0.8029 0.7102 0.9015
Pk transitive 0.9777 0.9679 0.9896 0.9993 1
Pk triple-acyclic 0.9777 0.9915 1.0000 1 1
Going deeper in the probability of the transitive collective weak preference,
we can not establish a clear relationship between the strength of the considered
g–transitivity condition and that probability as we can see in Table 4. For
example, for a number of voters equal to 100, the required threshold for a
simulated probability equal to 1 is 26.40 in the case of 0.5–transitive reciprocal
preference relations, 27.23 for min–transitive reciprocal preference relations,
27.90 for am–transitive ones and 25.47 in the case of max–transitive reciprocal
preference relations.
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Table 4 Thresholds k for simulated probabilities of Rk being transitive equal to 1.
m = 3 m = 10 m = 100 m = 1,000
0.5–trans. 2.97 7.95 26.40 84.83
min–trans. 2.96 8.32 27.23 95.32
am–trans. 2.97 7.48 27.90 83.01
max–trans. 2.98 7.56 25.47 80.00
However, looking at having the probability of the strict preference being
transitive equal to 1 (see Table 5), we can see that the higher the g–transitivity
condition is, the lower the required thresholds k are. We find an exception to
that in the case of m = 100, given that the threshold when regarding am–
transitive reciprocal preference relations is 9.17 whereas the one considering
max–transitive reciprocal preference relations equals 9.72 and therefore ex-
ceeds the previous one.
Table 5 Thresholds k for simulated probabilities of Pk being transitive equal to 1.
m = 3 m = 10 m = 100 m = 1,000
0.5–trans. 2.58 5.17 14.51 47.79
min–trans. 1.96 3.47 12.51 35.24
am–trans. 1.56 3.10 9.17 33.10
max–trans. 1.51 2.78 9.72 26.10
Considering the strict preference relation, we find that the higher the g–
transitive condition is, the lower the thresholds k that provide a simulated
probability of having triple-acyclic strict preferences equal to 1 are, with the
exception of the case of max–transitive reciprocal preference relations (see
Table 6).
Table 6 Thresholds k for simulated probabilities of Pk being triple-acyclic equal to 1.
m = 3 m = 4 m = 5 m = 10 m = 100 m = 1,000
0.5–trans. 1.32 1.50 1.91 2.65 8.29 26.60
min–trans. 0.67 0.88 0.90 1.40 4.56 14.99
am–trans. 0.56 0.67 0.83 1.11 3.34 11.68
max–trans. 0.67 0.72 0.75 0.99 3.58 9.95
Furthermore, as we can see in Table 7, regarding the value of the threshold
k that provides a simulated probability of the strict preference relation Pk
being transitive equal to 1, the percentage k/m decreases when the value of m
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increases. For example, look at the case of max–transitive reciprocal preference
relations. The percentage that the threshold represents over the number of
voters is a 50,Û3 percent in the case of m = 3, a 27.8 percent for m = 10, a 9.72
percent for m = 100 and a 2.61 percent in the instance of m = 1,000.
Table 7 k/m (%) and Pk transitive.
0.5–trans. min–trans. am–trans. max–trans.
m k k/m (%) k k/m (%) k k/m (%) k k/m (%)
3 2.58 86 1.96 65.Û3 1.56 52 1.51 50.Û3
10 5.17 51.7 3.47 34.7 3.10 31 2.78 27.8
100 14.51 14.51 12.51 12.51 9.17 9.17 9.72 9.72
1,000 47.79 4.78 35.24 3.52 33.10 3.31 26.10 2.61
Finally, considering the value of k that provides a simulated probability
of Pk being triple-acyclic equal to 1, the percentage k/m decreases when the
value of m increases, considering min–transitive and am–transitive reciprocal
preference relations. In Table 8, we have those percentages. As we can see, this
is not the case for 0.5–transitive reciprocal preference relations when regarding
m = 4 and m = 5 and max–transitive reciprocal preference relations when
considering m = 5, m = 100 and m = 1,000.
Table 8 k/m (%) and Pk triple-acyclic.
0.5–trans. min–trans. am–trans. max–trans.
m k k/m (%) k k/m (%) k k/m (%) k k/m (%)
3 1.32 44 0.67 22.Û3 0.56 18.Û6 0.67 22.Û3
4 1.50 37.5 0.88 22 0.67 16.75 0.72 18
5 1.91 38.2 0.90 18 0.83 16.Û6 0.75 0.15
100 8.29 26.5 4.56 4.56 3.34 3.34 3.58 3.58
1,000 26.60 2.66 14.99 1.499 11.68 1.168 9.95 0.995
5 Discussion
Recently some analytical studies about the consistency of majorities based on
difference in support have been developed. These theoretical results rely on
the needed threshold to ensure transitive and triple-acyclic strict preferences
for different types of transitive reciprocal preference relations.
On the one hand, the case of transitive strict preferences is studied in Lla-
mazares et al (2013). The results can be summarized as follows:
1. The transitivity of the strict preference can not be ensured for any threshold
of support k less than m− 1.
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2. The transitivity of the strict preference can not be ensured for any threshold
of support k less than m if the reciprocal preference relations are less
demanding than am–transitive ones.
3. The strict preference is transitive for any threshold of support such that k ∈
[m− 1,m) if the reciprocal preference relations are at least am–transitive
ones.
On the other hand, the case of triple-acyclic strict preferences is analysed
in Llamazares and Pe´rez-Asurmendi (2015) with the following results:
1. The triple-acyclicity of the strict preference, in the case of 0.5–transitive
reciprocal preference relations, can be guaranteed if the threshold of sup-
port k is located in
[b2m/3c,m) where bac stands for the integer part of
a.
2. The triple-acyclicity of the strict preference, in the case of min–transitive
and max–transitive reciprocal preference relations, can be guaranteed if
the threshold of support k belongs to [m/3,m).
3. In the case of max–transitive reciprocal preference relations, it conjectures
that strict preference relations are triple-acyclic if the threshold k belongs
to
[b2m/3c/2,m).
The probabilistic results setting here complement the above theoretical
ones by the following reasons. First, thresholds with associated probabilities
of consistent strict preferences equal to 1 are found for all the considered types
of transitive reciprocal preference relations. Second, reasonable thresholds are
required to certify the consistency of the strict preference with a probability
value of 1 in those cases where theoretical results asked a very high threshold to
guarantee such consistency. Third, the conjecture about the needed thresholds
in the case of max–transitive reciprocal preference relations seems to be true.
Specifically, in the case of transitive strict preferences with 0.5–transitive
and min–transitive reciprocal preference relations, the probabilities achieve the
value of 1 for the considered values of m (see Table 9) whereas as it is said be-
fore, the theoretical result asserts that no threshold guarantees the transitivity
of the strict preference for such types of reciprocal preference relations.
Table 9 Thresholds k such that the simulated probability of Pk being transitive is equal
to 1 with 0.5– and min–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m = 3 m = 4 m = 5 m = 10 m = 100 m = 1,000
k (0.5–trans.) 2.58 2.97 3.24 5.17 14.51 47.79
k (min–trans.) 1.96 2.49 2.61 3.47 12.51 35.24
In the cases of am–transitive and max–transitive reciprocal preference re-
lations, the thresholds that provide a probability value of transitive strict
preference relations equal to 1 are lower than the ones that guarantee the tran-
sitivity of the strict preference in the theoretical framework. Table 10 shows
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the theoretical minimum threshold required, i. e. m − 1, and the thresholds
that provide a simulated probability value equal to 1. To illustrate, look at the
case of m = 1,000. The theoretical result asserts that the threshold k has to
belong to [999, 1,000). By contrast, a probability value of 1 is achieved with a
threshold of 33.10 in the case of am-transitive reciprocal preference relations
and of 26.10 in the case of max–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
Table 10 Theoretical threshold k vs. thresholds k such that the simulated probability of Pk
being transitive is equal to 1 with am– and max–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m = 3 m = 4 m = 5 m = 10 m = 100 m = 1,000
m− 1 2 3 4 9 99 999
k (am–trans.) 1.56 1.85 2.07 3.10 9.17 33.10
k (max–trans.) 1.51 1.66 1.93 2.78 9.72 26.10
In the case of triple-acyclic strict preferences, the thresholds to reach a
probability value of 1 again are much lower than the ones required in the
theoretical setting. Tables 11, 12 and 13 illustrate that fact in the cases of 0.5–
and min–transitive reciprocal preference relations. In these cases we set forth
the minimum theoretical threshold required and the thresholds that provide a
simulated probability value equal to 1.
Table 11 Theoretical threshold k vs. thresholds k such that the simulated probability of
Pk being triple-acyclic is equal to 1 with 0.5–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m = 3 m = 4 m = 5 m = 10 m = 100 m = 1,000
b2m/3c 2 2 3 3 66 666
k 1.32 1.50 1.91 2.65 8.29 26.60
Table 12 Theoretical threshold k vs. thresholds k such that the simulated probability of
Pk being triple-acyclic is equal to 1 with min–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m = 3 m = 4 m = 5 m = 10 m = 100 m = 1,000
m/3 1 1.Û3 1.Û6 3.Û3 33.Û3 333.Û3
k 0.67 0.88 0.90 1.40 4.56 14.99
The case of max–transitive reciprocal preference relations deserves a spe-
cial attention. In Llamazares and Pe´rez-Asurmendi (2015), authors conjecture
that the needed threshold to guarantee the triple-acyclicity of the collective
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strict preference when individuals are endowed with max–transitive reciprocal
relations is lower or equal3 than in the case of individual min–transitive recip-
rocal relations. Unfortunately, they could not provide a formal proof for that
assertation. Comparing the thresholds k such that the simulated probability of
Pk is triple-acylic with a probability of 1 from Tables 12 and 13, we can corrob-
orate that conjecture. The thresholds in the case of max–transitive reciprocal
preference relations are smaller or equal than the ones in min–transitive case.
Table 13 Theoretical threshold k vs. thresholds k such that the simulated probability of
Pk being triple-acyclic is equal to 1 with max–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m = 3 m = 4 m = 5 m = 10 m = 100 m = 1,000[
b2m/3c/2,m
)
1 1 1.5 3 33 333
k 0.67 0.72 0.75 0.99 3.58 9.95
A quite natural question is to wonder if the consideration of reciprocal
preference relations has an impact on the probability of consistent decisions
when compared with the case of crisp preferences, i.e. when voters only declare
if they prefer an alternative to another one or if they are indifferent between
both alternatives.
To highlight this idea, we consider two cases: First, we focus on voters who
show linear preference orderings on the candidates. In other words, rpij ∈ {0, 1}
for each pair of alternatives xi and xj and each voter p. Second, we also consider
the case where individuals are endowed with weak preference orderings and
declare their preferences by means of values rpij ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}. If rpij = 0.5,
individual p is indifferent between both alternatives. Notice that in the first
case, these majorities are equivalent to supermajorities (see for a formal proof
of that Diss and Pe´rez-Asurmendi (2015)); in the second case, these voting
rules are majorities based on difference of votes.
For that aim, we find the thresholds which guarantee a probability equal
to 1 of Pk being triple-acyclic (Table 14), Pk being transitive (Table 15), and
Rk being transitive (Table 16) taking into account individual linear and weak
orderings and compare them with the corresponding ones when considering
individual reciprocal preference relations.
3 Notice that m/3 = b(2 · 100)/3c/2 when m is multiple of three.
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Table 14 Crisp preferences versus reciprocal preferences: Thresholds k such that the sim-
ulated probability of Pk being triple-acyclic is equal to 1.
m ↓
Crisp preferences Reciprocal preferences
rpij ∈ {0, 1} rpij ∈ {0, 0.5, 1} 0.5–trans. min–trans. am–trans. max–trans.
3 1 1 1.32 0.67 0.56 0.67
4 0 1 1.50 0.88 0.67 0.72
5 1 1 1.91 0.90 0.83 0.75
10 2 2 2.65 1.40 1.11 0.99
100 10 8 8.29 4.56 3.34 3.58
1000 36 30 26.60 14.99 11.68 9.95
Table 15 Crisp preferences versus reciprocal preferences: Thresholds k such that the sim-
ulated probability of Pk being transitive is equal to 1.
m ↓
Crisp preferences Reciprocal preferences
rpij ∈ {0, 1} rpij ∈ {0, 0.5, 1} 0.5–trans. min–trans. am–trans. max–trans.
3 1 1 2.58 1.96 1.56 1.51
4 2 2 2.97 2.49 1.85 1.66
5 3 3 3.24 2.61 2.07 1.93
10 6 7 5.17 3.47 3.10 2.78
100 26 21 14.51 12.51 9.17 9.72
1000 78 89 47.79 35.24 33.10 26.10
Table 16 Crisp preferences versus reciprocal preferences: Thresholds k such that the sim-
ulated probability of Rk being transitive is equal to 1.
m ↓
Crisp preferences Reciprocal preferences
rpij ∈ {0, 1} rpij ∈ {0, 0.5, 1} 0.5–trans. min–trans. am–trans. max–trans.
3 - - 2.97 2.96 2.97 2.98
4 - - 3.81 3.84 3.91 3.84
5 - - 4.70 4.80 4.91 4.72
10 - - 7.95 8.32 7.48 7.56
100 48 43 26.40 27.23 27.90 25.47
1000 147 172 84.83 95.32 83.01 80.00
We can deduce the following facts:
- For big electorates, required thresholds are lower when considering reciprocal
preference relations than in the case of crisp preferences with independence
of the analysed collective consistent decision (see the case of m = 1,000 in
Tables 14, 15, and 16).
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- In the case of the probability of Rk being transitive equal to 1 (Table 16),
we find thresholds to reach that probability when considering reciprocal
preference relations for all the considered number of individuals whilst in
the case of crisp preferences we cannot provide some of them. Notice that,
even for a threshold equal to k = m− 1, the probability of transitive Rk is
non null when considering crisp preferences. For instance, for m = 10 and
a threshold k = 9, the probability of transitive Rk is equal to 0.9944 and
0.9993 for rpij ∈ {0, 1} and rpij ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}, respectively.
- In the case of the probability of Pk being triple-acyclic equal to 1 (Ta-
ble 14), we find lower thresholds for min–transitive, am–transitive and
max–transitive reciprocal preference relations than for crisp preferences.
- The case of the probability of Pk being transitive equal to 1 (Table 15)
is more complex to analyse. On the one hand, the thresholds are lower
when considering crisp preferences and m = 3. On the other hand, recip-
rocal preferences provide lower thresholds for bigger electorates than that.
Specifically, greater than m = 3 when considering am–transitive and max–
transitive reciprocal preferences relations, greater than m = 4 in the case
of min–transitive reciprocal preference relations and greater than m = 10
when regarding 0.5–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
Therefore, we can ensure that considering reciprocal preference relations has an
unequivocal effect on the needed thresholds to reach a probability of collective
consistent decisions equal to 1 when considering big electorates.
Finally, we set forth the probabilities of consistent collective decisions with
crisp preferences and the ones with reciprocal preferences for a given number
of voters m and a given threshold k. Now our goal is to know if the likelihood
of consistent collective decisions is higher or smaller when the voters show
their preferences reciprocally than in the case where they are endowed with
linear or weak orderings. In Table 17, we set the probabilities when m = 3 and
m = 1,000 with the aim of distinguishing between the cases of small and big
electorates.
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Table 17 The impact of the individual type of preferences in the probability. The examples
of m = 3 and m = 1,000.
m = 3 m = 1,000
k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 10
rpij ∈ {0, 1}
Rk transitive 0.9511 0.6772 0.6908 0.8739 0.9004 0.8047
Pk transitive 0.9511 1 1 0.8907 0.9160 0.9137
Pk triple-acyclic 0.9511 1 1 0.9492 0.9643 0.9897
rpij ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}
Rk transitive 0.8736 0.6943 0.7827 0.9399 0.9339 0.8893
Pk transitive 0.9599 1 1 0.9442 0.9411 0.9272
Pk triple-acyclic 0.9944 1 1 0.9727 0.9761 0.9910
0.5–trans.
Rk transitive 0.8835 0.5438 0.8883 0.7816 0.7479 0.5794
Pk transitive 0.8835 0.9587 0.9994 0.8267 0.8241 0.8767
Pk triple-acyclic 0.8835 0.9997 1 0.9328 0.9477 0.9905
min–trans.
Rk transitive 0.9563 0.6551 0.8978 0.8802 0.8534 0.7092
Pk transitive 0.9563 0.9950 1 0.9245 0.9262 0.9659
Pk triple-acyclic 0.9563 1 1 0.9827 0.9886 0.9996
am–trans.
Rk transitive 0.9751 0.7036 0.8913 0.9113 0.8883 0.7640
Pk transitive 0.9751 0.9988 1 0.9536 0.9572 0.9857
Pk triple-acyclic 0.9751 1 1 0.9923 0.9959 1.0000
max–trans.
Rk transitive 0.9777 0.7102 0.9015 0.9184 0.8971 0.7726
Pk transitive 0.9777 0.9993 1 0.9609 0.9657 0.9904
Pk triple-acyclic 0.9777 1 1 0.9945 0.9970 1
For a small electorate (m = 3) we have found the following:
- For k = 0, the probabilities of transitive Rk are greater when consider-
ing min–transitive, am–transitive and max–transitive reciprocal preference
relations than when considering crisp and 0.5–transitive reciprocal prefer-
ences. The probabilities of transitive Pk are also greater bearing in mind
am–transitive and max–transitive reciprocal preference relations than any
other considering preferences. Nevertheless, the probability of triple-acyclic
Pk is greater in the case of weak orderings than in the other possible cases.
- For k = 1, the probabilities of transitive Rk are greater when regarding am–
transitive and max–transitive reciprocal preference relations than when
considering crisp preferences and these last ones are also greater than when
taking into account min–transitive and 0.5–transitive reciprocal preference
relations. The probabilities of transitive Pk are greater when regarding crisp
preferences than when considering reciprocal preference relations. In the
case of the probabilities of triple-acyclic Pk, crisp preferences and reciprocal
preference relations provide same probabilities with the exception of the
case of 0.5–reciprocal preference relations attached with a lower probability.
- For k = 2, the probabilities of consistent outcomes are greater or equal
when considering reciprocal preference relations than when regarding crisp
preferences with the exception of the probability of transitive Pk when
having 0.5 reciprocal preference relations.
For a big electorate (m = 1,000) we have the following:
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- For k = 3 the lowest probabilities of consistent outcomes are reached when
considering 0.5–transitive reciprocal preference relations. The probabilities
of transitive Rk are greater when considering weak orderings than max–
transitive, am–transitive, min–transitive reciprocal preference relations and
those ones are also greater than when regarding linear orderings. The prob-
abilities of transitive Pk are greater when considering am–transitive and
max–transitive reciprocal relations than when regarding weak orderings.
These last ones are greater than when considering min–transitive recip-
rocal relations which in turn are also greater than when regarding linear
orderings. In the case of the probabilities of triple-acylcic Pk, the great-
est ones corresponds to max–transitive, am–transitive and min–transitive
reciprocal preference relations followed by the ones attached to crisp pref-
erences.
- For k = 4 the probabilities of transitive Rk are greater when considering
crisp than reciprocal preference relations. The probabilities of transitive
and triple-acyclic Pk behave in the same way than in the case of k = 3
analysed above.
- For k = 10 the probabilities of transitive Rk are greater when considering
crisp than reciprocal preference relations. The probabilities of transitive
Pk are greater when considering max–transitive, am–transitive and min–
transitive reciprocal preference relations than when considering crisp pref-
erences. The lowest probabilities are reached when regarding 0.5–transitive
reciprocal preference relations. The probabilities of triple-acylcic Pk are
greater when considering reciprocal preference relations than when regard-
ing crisp preferences.
Therefore, we can not draw a clear conclusion about the relationship between
the probabilities and the considered type of individual preferences. For in-
stance, 0.5–transitive reciprocal preference relations give rise to the lowest
probabilities of consistent outcomes except in the cases of triple-acyclic Pk
with k = 2 for small electorates and with k = 10 for big electorates, respec-
tively.
For big electorates weak orderings provide greater probabilities of transitive
Rk than the remaining considered individual preferences. Instead, in the case
of small electorates, am–transitive and max–transitive reciprocal preference
relations promote the greatest probabilities.
Analysing the case of the probabilities of transitive Pk considering big
electorates, the greatest ones are reached when regarding max–transitive and
am–transitive reciprocal preference relations. That is also the case for m = 3
when considering k = 0 but not for the other considered values of k (notice
that in the case of k = 1 crisp preferences give rise to the highest probabilities
and in the case of k = 2 the probabilities are the same for all the considered in-
dividual preferences with the exception of 0.5–transitive reciprocal preference
relations).
Finally, when regarding the probabilities of triple-acyclic Pk we found that
the greatest probabilities are attached to weak orderings when m = 3 whereas
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 23
to max–transitive, am–transitive and min–transitive reciprocal preference re-
lations when m = 1,000.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate through simulations the probabilities of consistent
preferences under majorities based on difference in support: the probability
of having transitive weak preferences Rk, the probability of having transitive
strict preferences Pk, and the probability of having triple-acyclic strict prefer-
ences Pk. We start our simulations by assuming four types of transitivity con-
ditions for individual reciprocal preferences: 0.5-transitivity, min-transitivity,
am-transitivity, and max-transitivity.
This paper contains new contributions to the literature of reciprocal prefer-
ences. First, we have found the thresholds which guarantee that the probability
of consistent outcomes is equal to 1. These thresholds are much lower than the
ones required in the theoretical setting. In fact, our results show a dramatic
difference between these two thresholds: For instance, in some cases, the simu-
lated threshold represents less than a 3% of the total number of voters whereas
the theoretical one reaches the 67%. Given that the needed thresholds to reach
consistent decisions with probability equal to 1 are not too demanding, the
implementation of majorities based in difference of support have sense when-
ever the flexibility attached to individual preferences by the consideration of
reciprocal preference relations and the consistency of the collective decision
is a concern for the policy maker or for the society as a whole. Second, we
have set forth the impact of the threshold k on the probability of consistent
outcomes for a given number of voters. The probability of having transitive
weak preferences Rk as well as the probability of having transitive strict pref-
erences Pk exhibit a similar behaviour: for the lowest values of the threshold
k, it decreases as the value of the threshold k increases whereas for higher
values of k, it increases with the value of the threshold k. However, the prob-
ability of having triple-acyclic strict preferences Pk increases when the value
of the threshold k does, for any number of voters. Third, we have compared
the needed thresholds to reach a probability of collective consistent decisions
equal to 1 regarding reciprocal preference relations with the ones considering
crisp preferences and concluded that the thresholds are significantly lower in
the case of reciprocal preference relations than in the case of crisp preferences.
Finally, we have studied if the consideration of reciprocal preference relations
instead of crisp preferences has an impact in the probability of collective con-
sistent decisions. We have found that the probability depends on the concrete
considered individual preference relation and on the size of the electorate.
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Table A.1 Probabilities of transitive Rk for 0.5–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.8835 0.8781 0.8763 0.8751 0.8706 0.8705 0.8728
2.97 1 0.9836 0.9485 0.7630 0.5927 0.7826 0.8655
3.81 1 0.9964 0.9065 0.5481 0.7544 0.8633
4.70 1 0.9748 0.5312 0.7248 0.8609
7.95 1 0.6729 0.6266 0.8518
26.40 1 0.7012 0.7954
84.83 1 0.6156
95.32 0.5913
Table A.2 Probabilities of transitive Rk for min–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9563 0.9513 0.9505 0.9487 0.9468 0.9476 0.9455
2.96 1 0.9831 0.9528 0.8015 0.7220 0.8814 0.9400
3.84 1 0.9966 0.9205 0.6776 0.8576 0.9383
4.80 1 0.9809 0.6552 0.8307 0.9366
8.32 1 0.7559 0.7432 0.9291
27.23 1 0.7702 0.8831
95.32 1 0.7189
Table A.3 Probabilities of transitive Rk for am–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9751 0.9710 0.9712 0.9694 0.9676 0.9670 0.9692
2.97 1 0.9812 0.9492 0.8087 0.7738 0.9117 0.9650
3.91 1 0.9971 0.9225 0.7295 0.8904 0.9636
4.91 1 0.9813 0.7043 0.8683 0.9622
7.48 1 0.7370 0.8112 0.9582
27.90 1 0.7873 0.9180
83.01 1 0.7967
95.32 0.7731
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Table A.4 Probabilities of transitive Rk for max–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9777 0.9766 0.9751 0.9741 0.9727 0.9726 0.9744
2.98 1 0.9842 0.9561 0.8219 0.7867 0.9189 0.9708
3.84 1 0.9964 0.9241 0.7450 0.9003 0.9696
4.72 1 0.9782 0.7188 0.8805 0.9681
7.56 1 0.7495 0.8190 0.9637
25.47 1 0.7720 0.9298
80.00 1 0.8030
95.32 0.7744
Table A.5 Probabilities of transitive Pk for 0.5–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.8835 0.8781 0.8763 0.8751 0.8706 0.8705 0.8728
2.58 1 0.9999 0.9995 0.9916 0.8512 0.8287 0.8668
2.97 1 1.0000 0.9970 0.8661 0.8268 0.8659
3.24 1 0.9985 0.8759 0.8257 0.8654
5.17 1 0.9465 0.8267 0.8611
14.51 1 0.9295 0.8440
47.79 1 0.8293
Table A.6 Probabilities of transitive Pk for min–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9563 0.9513 0.9505 0.9487 0.9468 0.9476 0.9455
1.96 1 0.9999 0.9997 0.9968 0.9377 0.9271 0.9421
2.49 1 1.0000 0.9993 0.9514 0.9255 0.9414
2.61 1 0.9995 0.9533 0.9254 0.9413
3.47 1 0.9704 0.9248 0.9398
12.51 1 0.9793 0.9291
35.24 1 0.9251
47.79 0.9311
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Table A.7 Probabilities of transitive Pk for am–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9751 0.9710 0.9712 0.9694 0.9676 0.9670 0.9692
1.56 1 0.9999 0.9997 0.9973 0.9605 0.9551 0.9672
1.85 1 1.0000 0.9990 0.9655 0.9542 0.9668
2.07 1 0.9995 0.9697 0.9538 0.9665
3.10 1 0.9845 0.9538 0.9653
9.17 1 0.9828 0.9600
33.10 1 0.9570
47.79 0.9629
Table A.8 Probabilities of transitive Pk for max–transitive reciprocal preference relations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9777 0.9766 0.9751 0.9741 0.9727 0.9726 0.9744
1.51 1 1.0000 0.9999 0.9981 0.9689 0.9619 0.9727
1.66 1 0.9999 0.9989 0.9712 0.9614 0.9725
1.93 1 0.9996 0.9758 0.9608 0.9723
2.78 1 0.9870 0.9607 0.9715
9.72 1 0.9897 0.9662
26.10 1 0.9626
47.79 0.9690
Table A.9 Probabilities of triple-acyclic Pk for 0.5–transitive reciprocal preference rela-
tions.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.8835 0.8781 0.8763 0.8751 0.8706 0.8705 0.8728
1.32 1 0.9999 0.9998 0.9967 0.9479 0.9013 0.8763
1.50 1 1.0000 0.9983 0.9546 0.9052 0.8768
1.91 1 0.9998 0.9681 0.9135 0.8778
2.65 1 0.9837 0.9270 0.8794
8.29 1 0.9834 0.8926
26.60 1 0.9291
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Table A.10 Probabilities of triple-acyclic Pk for min–transitive reciprocal preference rela-
tions.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9563 0.9513 0.9505 0.9487 0.9468 0.9476 0.9455
0.67 1 0.9998 0.9997 0.9971 0.9812 0.9583 0.9467
0.88 1 1.0000 0.9993 0.9817 0.9612 0.9471
0.90 1 0.9993 0.9906 0.9614 0.9472
1.40 1 0.9906 0.9675 0.9481
4.56 1 0.9913 0.9540
14.99 1 0.9687
26.60 0.9799
Table A.11 Probabilities of triple-acyclic Pk for am–transitive reciprocal preference rela-
tions.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9751 0.9710 0.9712 0.9694 0.9676 0.9670 0.9692
0.56 1 1.0000 0.9998 0.9986 0.9854 0.9743 0.9698
0.67 1 1.0000 0.9995 0.9876 0.9758 0.9700
0.83 1 0.9999 0.9905 0.9775 0.9702
1.11 1 0.9941 0.9804 0.9706
3.34 1 0.9936 0.9730
11.68 1 0.9811
26.60 0.9911
Table A.12 Probabilities of triple-acyclic Pk for max–transitive reciprocal preference re-
lations.
m→ 3 4 5 10 100 1,000 100,000
k ↓
0 0.9777 0.9766 0.9751 0.9741 0.9727 0.9726 0.9744
0.67 1 1.0000 0.9999 0.9998 0.9909 0.9804 0.9753
0.72 1 1.0000 0.9999 0.9918 0.9808 0.9753
0.75 1 0.9999 0.9922 0.9811 0.9754
0.99 1 0.9951 0.9834 0.9758
3.58 1 0.9963 0.9786
9.95 1 0.9845
26.60 0.9943
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